Is Arab Democracy Good for the West — and Israel? |
The dilemma is most acute inside Israel, where each Egyptian scenario has an almost immediate impact. It is impossible to exaggerate the degree to which Israel will feel the shockwaves of this Arab revolution. But it is unclear just what that impact will be. That’s why Israelis have used tectonic metaphors to describe the situation. Many have called it “an earthquake,” while others have said that Israel is now “living on a volcano.” Like observers in the U.S. and Europe, Israelis have felt mixed emotions when watching the images of spontaneous revolt against the three-decade-long dictatorship of President Hosni Mubarak. Israel is home to some of the most ardent advocates of democracy, people like Natan Sharansky, a former Soviet dissident who spent a part of his life in the Siberian gulag. Sharansky has argued that Israel should not make deals with dictators, even if they offer peace, saying nobody — not Israel, not the U.S. — should trust a dictator who mistreats his own people. Contrary to the common perception, a large percentage of Israelis are deeply idealistic and progressive. But Israel is also a country whose very survival may depend on making the right strategic decisions. Nothing fosters realism more than heavily armed enemies on your borders. As Yossi Klein Halevi explained, “Israelis want to rejoice over the outbreak of protests in Egypt’s city squares.” But, he added, “the grim assumption is that it is just a matter of time before the only real opposition group in Egypt, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, takes power.” The unfolding revolution in Egypt, with reverberations in the rest of Arab world, has caused anxious hand-wringing and a gnawing moral quandary in many capitals. This time, the dilemma is not academic. The showdown in Cairo drew into sharp focus the inconsistency between the democratic West’s avowed values and its realpolitik behavior. While Washington and its European friends speak out loudly for political freedom and human rights, they have spent decades knowingly supporting Arab dictators who violently suppressed democracy, for the sake of stability. Suddenly, the very Western governments that have proclaimed their passion for democratic rights faced a stark choice: Would they support the protesters demanding the dictator step down, or would they stand by their man, hoping to preserve that much-prized stability? The ambivalence was apparent in Israel, when the office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu released a statement saying that Netanyahu, in private conversations, had told other leaders that Israel is a democratic nation that supports democratic values in the entire Middle East. “The advancement of these values will help peace,” Netanyahu said, before adding, “However, if this will make it possible for extreme forces to take advantage of democratic processes to rise to power and promote anti-democratic goals — as happened in Iran and elsewhere — then the results will harm both peace and democracy.” The statement came after Netanyahu had urged the West not to abandon Mubarak. Israelis already see the outlines of what could turn Egypt, a country with which it has had a cold peace since 1979, into a dangerous enemy. Muhammed Ghanem, a top figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, was quoted in Iran’s Al-Alam on Monday saying that the Egyptian people should prepare for war against Israel. Another ominous sign came in Tunisia, where the Arab revolt toppled its first dictator. There, unknown men set an old synagogue on fire, while nearby police did nothing. One of the most dangerous aspects of today’s events is that, while many of the Arab autocrats have good relations with Washington and often quietly good relations with Israel, their populations have been fed a diet of anti-American and especially anti-Israel conspiracy theories. No one painted the outlines of today’s dilemma better than Sharansky, author of, “The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror.” Writing at a time when the Camp David Accords, a treaty signed by an unelected Egyptian president, had already kept the peace for a quarter century, Sharansky articulated the fears he heard in response to his support for Arab democracy: Isn’t it dangerous? Isn’t it unstable for some other people? For us it’s good to be in freedom and democracy, but if we are talking about countries where fundamentalists can raise their head, do we want a democratic government? Isn’t it better to guarantee stability by finding your own dictator? The answer for Sharansky is clear: Everyone, in every country, deserves democracy. Besides, making deals with dictators ultimately produces disastrous results. Sharansky often quotes his fellow Soviet-era refusenik Andrei Sakharov, saying, “You cannot trust leaders who do not trust their own people.” Dictators cannot be trusted, so peace will be an illusion. More importantly for Israel, dictators need external enemies. When Israel and Egypt signed a peace agreement, the Egyptian dictatorship risked losing a much-needed enemy. So Egypt tried to have it both ways. While keeping official peace with Israel, it allowed anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment to brew for decades, with practically no effort to counteract it. Now Israel and the West are losing their ally at the top, and are left with a population whose views are sharply different from those of the government they despise. That is true even if Islamists do not take power. The answer to the West’s dilemma could have come years ago, if it had more forcefully pushed friendly Arab dictators to allow civic society to develop in their countries and to allow democratic values to develop. No one would argue that would have been easy, but it would have helped bridge the yawning gap between the West’s ideals and rhetoric and its actions. Now, the West faces the instability it feared. If Sharansky is right, the West is now paying the price of not living by its principles. Eventually, however, if democracy takes hold in Egypt, the outcome will be positive for Israel and for the West. The regime that ultimately assumes power might end up being less friendly, but Egypt would be ruled by a government that doesn’t need external enemies, and one so focused on helping its own people that it would have no interest in launching a new war. Israelis, like observers in the West, can only hope that democracy takes hold. Frida Ghitis is an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor. Her weekly column, World Citizen, appears every Thursday. http://www.turkishforum.com.tr/en/content/2011/02/05/is-arab-democracy-good-for-the-west-and-israel/
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Return of the Turks as Middle East kingmaker |
| The unprecedented levels and inter-linkages of the protests against the traditional authoritarian regimes represented most starkly by President Mubarak, has brought the Middle East back to a period more reminiscent of the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Arab nationalism than anything seen in recent memory. The declarations and prognostications of analysts across the Arab world in the wake of these events has focused on the grassroots movements and pent-up resentments that led to the protests along with debates about the level of US involvement from twitter feeds to President Obama’s statements. However the effect of this on the regional dynamics that has ushered in the remarkable arrival of a new player to the game of Middle Eastern great-power politics and the sidelining of traditional players is equally important to pay attention to. At no time since their days at the helm of the Ottoman Empire have the Turks been as actively involved diplomatically (record number of visits bilaterally to Arab world in the last month alone with multiple visits to Lebanon and Syria for the foreign minister), economically (greatest increase in trade volume over any two year period), or politically (inclusion of Turkey into the Arab League and head of the Organization of Islamic Conference) as they are in the Arab world today. While this imperial baggage continues to cast a shadow over Turkish-Arab relations, the expediency of the present seems to have overcome the past. The almost immediate involvement of Turkey and Qatar in brokering a compromise after the government of Saad Hariri collapsed demonstrated the countries’ interest in fostering regional stability. Prime Minister Erdogan’s most recent speech, in which he warned President Mubarak to “step down” and “take steps that will satisfy his people,” is a clear indicator of Turkey’s arrival as the Middle East’s self-appointed kingmaker. Having waited for close to a week to make a grand proclamation on the events taking place in his neighborhood, Erdogan responded clearly and forcibly to his domestic critics of his foreign policy by placing Turkey on the side of the anti-regime movements throughout the Middle East. Proclaiming that, “Turkey is playing a role that can upturn all the stones in the region and that can change the course of history.” Erdogan shone a spotlight on his Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) pursuit of “foreign policy with character.” Critics quickly pointed to Erdogan’s hypocrisy when it came to his embrace of Iranian President Ahmadenijad’s oppression of the Green Movement in 2009 and President Omar Al-Bashir’s regime in Sudan, but few Turks seem concerned. As seen from the region, Turkey’s strategy of diplomatic and economic engagement has been a welcome one. With its non-sectarian and pragmatic focus, Ankara offers the greatest economic incentives to find a political and sustainable as opposed to violent solutions to the problems of the Middle East today. The opportunity for Ankara comes in part because of the lack of Arab leadership and in part because of its own proactive policies in a region that it once ignored. While leading Arab states, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have been less enthusiastic about the protest movements and Turkey’s emerging role, particularly in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and intra-Arab affairs, fearing a loss of primacy in these areas they have little choice. Their very weakness in comparison to the economic opportunities and popularity of an indigenous democracy led by a freely elected legitimate conservative Muslim party makes the case for Turkey even stronger. On the whole, the Turks have been embraced by both the Arab states and street that welcome the pragmatic and business-savvy nature of Turkish diplomacy. As a gateway to both Europe and America, Turkey has already established itself an important player and convening spot for the actors of the region. The popularity of Turkey and Erdogan within the Arab world has already allowed the AKP to turn traditional Turkish foreign policy on its head by drawing strength from its common heritage and history with its Middle Eastern neighbors rather than being a handicap. Turkish foreign policy under the AKP has come to articulate a vision for improving relations with all its neighbors, particularly by privileging its former Ottoman space in the Middle East, such as Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria where agreements are being negotiated for a free-trade zone and an eventual Middle Eastern Union. The growing economic and political engagement of Turkey with the Middle East has already lead to a significant realignment in the region. Turkey offers the prospect of realigning the region by countering revisionist and securitizing trends rampant in the Middle East geopolitically while serving as an economic engine to propel the region. In today’s Middle East, states like Iran and Israel through their rhetoric (particularly in the case of the former) and actions (more in the case of the latter) raise suspicion, anxiety and fear of revisionism, triggering an accelerated securitization in the region and do not offer a compelling sustainable economic or political model of success. By contrast, Turkey as an entrepreneurial free marketplace is trying to foster relations with all parties through bilateral relations and regional integration. With the fastest growing and largest economy in the Middle East, Turkey is uniquely placed to play a decisive role in providing alternatives models for the newly emerging governments of the region. As a longtime ally of the West and new partner of Iran and Syria, Turkey has been seeking the role of mediator and model in every available arena including Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia. As a G-20 founding member, holder of a seat on the UN Security Council, European Union aspirant, and head of the OIC, Ankara has transformed itself into an international actor, capable of bringing considerable clout and influence to its regions. Turkey did not transform itself from a defeated post-Ottoman state led by Ataturk’s military to a flourishing market-democracy overnight, it has been almost a century in the making, however the lessons learned and the opportunities offered by Turkey to Egypt and the rest of the Arab world should be cautiously heeded. The Turks are poised to return as the Middle East’s most important and influential kingmaker. Dr. Joshua W. Walker is a post-doctoral fellow at the Crown Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Brandeis University. http://www.turkishforum.com.tr/en/content/2011/02/05/return-of-the-turks-as-middle-east-kingmaker/ |
From Caution to Boldness: U.S. Policy toward Egypt |
Watch this event at C-Span.orgAs the situation in Egypt continues to unfold, U.S. policy has evolved with breathtaking speed. Just last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the Mubarak regime was stable, but by Tuesday evening, President Obama was making the remarkable statement that Egypt’s transition needs to begin “now.” This is not only the most serious foreign policy challenge to this U.S. administration, but also one in a list of unforeseen and improbable challenges. Unlike scenarios involving, for example, a North Korean provocation against the South or even a catastrophic terrorist attack — for which the United States plans and prepares — the swift demise of Hosni Mubarak’s presidency, along with the virtual disappearance of the ruling National Democratic Party and the potential fall of a regime that has been a pillar of U.S. standing in the Middle East for thirty-five years, is an unimagined challenge.In that context, President Obama and his advisors generally deserve high marks. Although the administration has, at times, been off balance in its statements, it has now defined a policy and is incrementally seeing it through. This is an evolving situation, the course of which the United States is able to affect only on the margins. Still, the administration has adopted a policy that can only be described as bold — and risky. At its core is a reliance on the Egyptian military to perform its national duty and remove Mubarak from power. More likely than not, Obama’s “transition” statement was based on intelligence and the analytical conclusion that senior Egyptian military leaders were already on the precipice of taking steps against Mubarak. Should Mubarak Stay or Go?That question appears to have now been answered with thundering clarity: in the eyes of the administration, it seems that he should go. For U.S. policy — and for Egyptians at large — there is no future for Mubarak. There is a question of timing, however. Mubarak has asked for eight more months, and President Obama’s Tuesday statement stopped just short of saying he needed to resign immediately, leaving some room for ambiguity. Yet to Middle Easterners, the imagery of Mubarak and Obama appearing on television just moments after each other — one saying “September” and the other saying “now” — projected a clear message. The result is that every day Mubarak stays in office is a rebuke to Obama. Indeed, Mubarak may decide to stay a bit longer just to make the point that Obama could not push himWhat Is the Military’s Role?This is the key variable in the equation. The most important observation is that — despite billions of dollars in U.S. assistance, thousands of military exchanges, and dozens of joint exercises — there are large parts of the Egyptian military about which the United States knows very little. Still, up until the news of violence, the military was viewed as the most respected institution in the country and not necessarily complicit in the regime’s excesses. It is therefore the institution most likely to trigger change.At the moment, the military is undergoing a tug-of-war for its soul. On the one hand, Mubarak has named a triumvirate of leaders from various services — intelligence, army, air force — to bring them and the armed forces closer to him and make them full partners in the effort to extend his rule. On the other hand, the military has (at least until the violence) refused to fire on citizens, a fact reflected in Obama’s heady compliments on Tuesday. In effect, Mubarak and Obama are each appealing to the military, one asking them “to stay the course” and the other urging them “to do the right thing” by removing Mubarak and beginning the transition. Military leaders are in a bind, but they must decide which route to take soon, because every day of inaction implicates them with the regime. And for President Obama, every day that passes without change further erodes an already weakened U.S. image. Should the United States Suspend Aid?Some have argued for suspending all U.S. aid to Egypt immediately. Although their objective is understandable, their prescription is incorrect. Again, the most likely agent of peaceful change at the moment — the institution most likely to trigger transition — is the military. The United States should therefore remain in contact with this institution in order to influence it, to the extent possible. The idea that Washington gains influence by cutting off assistance simply does not translate into Arabic. The administration is correct to maintain its current posture, continuing economic and military assistance to Egypt until it has greater clarity on the ground. A time may come, if the military decides fully to side with Mubarak or shoot protesters, when Washington can decide whether to suspend aid, but for now it should maintain the limited leverage and influence it has.What Does Transition Mean in Practice?Transition surely means something different to new Egyptian vice president Omar Suleiman than it does to opposition figures such as Mohamed ElBaradei or the head of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). It is difficult to envision a nonregime figure — that is, someone who is neither a member of the national security establishment nor a proregime public figure (e.g., Arab League secretary-general Amr Mousa) — emerging as a transitional leader. Most likely, such a leader will come from the triumvirate of military figures Mubarak has named. Once a decision is finally made, many oppositionists may in fact breathe a sigh of relief after so much attention has been focused on the question of whether Mubarak will step down. If the new leadership shows itself to be serious about implementing constitutional, legal, and administrative changes to permit free and fair elections, this may suffice.The Bigger PictureTrite as it may sound, the events in Egypt are a true earthquake for U.S. posture in the Middle East. Even before this week’s events, the United States was on a losing streak: Lebanon went from Hariri to Hizballah, Syria broke out from years of U.S.-imposed isolation, Muqtada al-Sadr got back in the saddle in Iraq, and the “peace process” — which Obama proclaimed a top priority — has remained dismally stuck in neutral for two years. The administration’s few victories, such as broad support for Iran sanctions, do not stack up.For now, a sober assessment of the Egypt situation leads one to conclude that it is neither the disaster some fear nor the dawn of a new day that some hope. Both outcomes are possible. On the plus side, the protests have been largely anti-Mubarak but not anti-America or anti-peace. Of course, that could change. And on the negative side, the absence of opposition leadership could open avenues for more radical elements to fill the void. Accordingly, concern about the Muslim Brotherhood’s potential emergence is warranted. The MB is not, as some suggest, simply an Egyptian version of the March of Dimes; it is a fundamentally political organization that seeks to reorder Egyptian (and broader Muslim) society in an Islamist fashion. Tactically, the group will exploit whatever opportunities it is offered; it has renounced its most ambitious goals and violent means only as a result of regime compulsion, not by free choice. Although the United States should do nothing to advocate for the MB’s inclusion in Egypt’s future political set-up, neither should it operate under the assumption that the group’s ascension to power is inevitable, given the country’s broad range of political alternatives. In fact, such an assumption is very dangerous and could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. As for concerns about Egypt’s regional posture, some changes are surely in order. America’s pillar is gone — for the time being, there is no Arab state willing and able to project power more or less in concert with the United States. Some will say that this has not been the case with Egypt for some time; yet, although Cairo’s influence has indeed waned, no other Arab state could ever come close to Egypt even on its bad days. Cairo’s pillar status can be rejuvenated if the transition leads to a new government that both has popular support and sees value in continued strategic partnership with the United States — a difficult but not impossible configuration. But that will take a long time. Israel-Egypt RelationsOn the Arab-Israeli front, prognosticating about a post-Mubarak government’s view is pure speculation. Certain assessments are worthwhile, however. First, Cairo is unlikely to abrogate the Israel-Egypt peace treaty; Egypt’s national security is too bound up in it. It is likely that an Egypt looking to maximize its own interests will maintain relations with Israel.Beyond the treaty itself, Mubarak presided over such a cold peace with Israel that there are only a few things that could change. In the near term, gas sales to Israel and continued operation of the Qualifying Industrial Zones are variables. If a new government in Cairo bases its stance purely on Egyptian interests, both would remain unchanged. Currently, however, one of the few items on which virtually of Egypt’s fractious opposition parties agree is the cessation of gas sales to Israel. The biggest area of change would most likely be Gaza. As a partner with Israel in maintaining tight control of the territory, Cairo has put much effort into protecting the border. Although the government is likely to continue playing some role in preventing the import and export of weapons, many Egyptians want to end the perception that their country is helping to impede normal economic life in Gaza. Accordingly, devising a new border policy that is not based on Egypt’s active participation is a high priority. In the meantime, Israel is unlikely to take risks on other fronts when its southern front has just become an uncertainty for the first time in thirty years. More likely, Israel will wait to assess the impact of these events on its national security once the dust has cleared in Cairo. While wisely eschewing commentary on Egypt’s domestic situation, Israel certainly has reason to loudly declare its interest that any successor government in Egypt fulfill its international obligations, such as maintaining the peace treaty. Indeed, this requirement should be the international community’s policy as well. This summary was edited by Allison LeBlanc. http://www.turkishforum.com.tr/en/content/2011/02/05/from-caution-to-boldness-u-s-policy-toward-egypt/ |
-- -~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~ ŞEHRİN ÜSTÜNDEN GEÇEN BULUTLAR Bakıp imreniyorum akınına Şehrin üstünden geçen bulutların, Belki gidiyorlar yakınına Rüyamızı kuşatan hudutların. Evler, ağaçlar, sular, ben bu an Sanki bulutlarla bir, akıyoruz; Onların hevesine uyaraktan Cenup ufuklarına bakıyoruz. Biz de hafif olsaydık bir rüzgardan, Yer alsaydık şu bulut kervanında, Güzele?e ve Yeni?ye doğru koşan Bu sonrasız gidişin bir yanında; Dağlara, denizlere, ovalara Uzansaydık yağarak iplik iplik Tohumları susamış tarlalara Bahar, gölge ve yağmur götürseydik. Bakıp imreniyorum akınına Şehrin üstünden uçan bulutların. Gidiyor, gidiyorlar yakınına Rüyamızı kuşatan hudutların. Ahmet Muhip DRANAS oO-------------------------------------------------------------------Oo http://orajpoyraz.blogspot.com/
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